Fifteen days after the latest salami-slicing attempt with 300 PLA soldiers in Yangtse (Tawang), the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, declared that “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military channels and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas”. He gave no explanation for the PLA intrusions which have gone on regularly for over two decades.
Occupation of Indian territory, or disputed territory, which had long been considered no man’s land, or placing blocks on the routes which were regularly patrolled/occupied by India, are all part of such tactics. Since 2020, these intrusions have resulted in brawls, scuffles and the use of crude, lethal sticks between the PLA and Indian soldiers.
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In early 2020, the PLA carried out a major military exercise in the Tibetan Plateau. In April, two divisions were diverted to strengthen its deployments on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, leading to its part-occupation of Depsang Plains and salami-slicing attempts in the Galwan valley, Pangong Tso area and a few other locations. The clash in the Galwan valley on June 15, 2020 resulted in the death of 20 Indians and an unknown number of PLA soldiers. These confrontations have led to deployment of over 60,000 fully armed troops on the LAC by each side, equipped for a conventional war. At many locations, these deployments are in eyeball to eyeball situations. Both sides are also engaged in improving their border military infrastructure. Political and diplomatic talks and 17 rounds of military level discussions have not resulted in expected “disengagement” of troops at many places in Eastern Ladakh. The “de-escalation” process, which was to follow “disengagement”, is nowhere in sight.
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With the latest PLA attempt to occupy Yangtse, using tactics as witnessed in Eastern Ladakh, it is obvious that China is in no mood to relent. It will continue its coercive diplomacy and engage Indian troops in aggressive tactics and border skirmishes. No Indian strategist takes Wang Yi’s statements about “upholding stability in the border areas” seriously.
How are our frontline military units placed in this background? I believe many considerations, including some political and diplomatic decisions, are stacked against them which need urgent review.
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First, the rules of engagement (ROE): China has repeatedly flouted all five agreements on LAC/border issues, signed with India since 1993. There is neither peace nor tranquillity for the soldiers posted on the LAC. Why, then, is the Indian army being made to follow the ROE which were drawn as a follow up of these broken agreements? It is wrong to expect the army, any army, to get involved in physical melees, brawls and scuffles with its adversary. No army is expected to fight with crude sticks. Even on sentry duty, a soldier is expected to stop any stranger at a distance. If that person continues to advance, the soldier on duty is expected to fire for effect. It is high time that we follow the same norms on the LAC. Our soldiers should be allowed to fire if, despite warning, the adversary continues to advance toward our position. No politicians will then be able to say that “Hamare soldiers ki pitayee ho rahee hai”.
Second, LAC perceptions: Why do we continue to use terms like “our” and “their” perceptions of the LAC? When the government of India has given maps on which the LAC is marked and expects the military to ensure that no territory is lost, such little known perceptions of the LAC invariably cause a fiasco while explaining the situation in Parliament and to the public. The Chinese do not use the terminology of perception in their statements. In fact, it gives them a handle to continue with their aggression activities as happened post Galwan. In the geographically transparent environment which prevails today, we must give out our version of the LAC subject to a final resolution of the boundary dispute with China. We need to be straightforward and remain firm on the ground.ADVERTISEMENT
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Third, intelligence and surveillance: Intelligence is a nation’s first line of defence. This, with our surveillance structure, is a critical constituent of safety, security and also grand strategy. In the kind of terrain where the military is operating, it is almost impossible to defend “every inch of territory”. We need reliable and timely information to mobilise adequate forces where the adversary is expected to strike or intrude. It requires a round-the-clock, high level of intelligence, all-weather surveillance capabilities and assessments for the troops on the ground. In 2020, despite satellite imagery, high altitude UAVs and availability of a host of modern surveillance equipment, we failed to assess and react to the Chinese troops’ movements in Eastern Ladakh. Our intelligence and surveillance structure along the northern border requires urgent focus and improvement wherever gaps exist.
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Fourth, dual command and control: The Western and Central sectors of the LAC are guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Patrol (ITBP) backed by the army. However, both work under different ministries. Despite several discussions, there is no unified command and control, which often leads to a lack of coordination, responsibility and accountability. The ITBP units deployed on the LAC, now hot, need to be placed under the operational control of the army.
Fifth, offensive spirit: During training, we diligently inculcate and imbibe an offensive spirit in our military. And yet, most of the time, we expect the military to remain defensive and passive on the border. Our frontline military formations should not only be capable of defending intrusions but also plan and be prepared to retaliate proactively — Kailash Range style — taking advantage of the high altitude mountainous terrain.
